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1. Introduction
Property is a key concept in determining how society is organised. Its relevance 
for the European integration process is recognised in a treaty provision whose 
origin can be traced back to the Schuman Declaration of 1950 and to Article 83 
of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (TECSC) of 
1951. The present wording of the provision is found in Article 345 of the Trea­
ty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):
The Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing 
the system of property ownership.
An almost identical provision had already been included in Article 222 of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC) of 1957 
which later became Article 295 of the Treaty establishing the European Com­
munity (TEC). While the aims behind Article 83 TECSC are fairly well known,1 
this is not the case with Article 222 TEEC and its subsequent incarnations. Ar­
ticle 222 TEEC introduced the provision of Article 83 TECSC for the first time 
in the context of general economic integration, and broadened its wording. How­
ever, it is unknown what exactly the original purposes of Article 222 TEEC 
were, that is, how it was supposed to define the role of property with respect to 
general economic integration, as opposed to the sectoral approach of the TEC­
SC. It is also unknown whether and how its purposes have changed in subse­
quent stages of the integration process.
Still today, Article 345 TFEU leaves fundamental questions unanswered. 
For example, does it establish a division of competences between the European 
Union (EU) and the Member States? If so, what competences does it concern 
and how are they divided? Is it to be interpreted differently in different contexts? 
1 See section 2.1 below.
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Does it affect the prospects for developing a European property law or other 
property­related law at EU level?
Different viewpoints, such as those of integration history and the various 
property­related fields of law reveal different dimensions of Article 345 TFEU, 
for example the functions the provision is perceived to serve. In what follows, 
Article 345 TFEU is examined from four viewpoints.2 Section 2 explores Article 
345 TFEU in the light of the early stages of European integration and the mul­
tilingual setting of European law (Losada). Section 3 reviews interpretations of 
the provision with respect to unification and harmonisation efforts in the field 
of property law (Juutilainen). Section 4 explains the relation of the provision to 
competition law (Havu). Finally, section 5 examines the provision at the inter­
section of competition law and the law of intellectual property (Vesala).
A central reference point for this discussion is a recent study by Bram Akker-
mans and Eveline Ramaekers, which seeks to clarify the provision of Article 345 
TFEU by analysing its drafting as well as its use by EU institutions and by 
Member States.3 Akkermans and Ramaekers arrive at a rather narrow interpreta­
tion of the article. According to them, the provision limits, but does not prevent, 
application of the TFEU as a whole to the way in which Member State rules deal 
with ownership of undertakings. In their view, the provision only concerns 
whether undertakings are held in public or private ownership, leaving this to be 
regulated by the Member States. The content and objects of the right of owner­
ship are, so the argument goes, outside the scope of the provision. Accordingly, 
they conclude that the provision does not prevent development of a European 
property law. 
2. Taking History and Multilingualism into Account when 
Interpreting Article 345 TFEU
2.1. The Origin of the Provision
Akkermans and Ramaekers address the issue of how Article 345 TFEU should 
be interpreted. Despite their great attention to detail, some crucial questions 
remain unanswered. These concern the reasons why a similar provision was 
included in the Treaties from the very beginning of the European integration 
2 The discussion is based on the authors’ contributions at the seminar »What Role for Prop­
erty in European Integration? An Exchange of Ideas between Maastricht and Helsinki» orga­
nised by the Centre of Excellence Foundations of European Law and Polity in Helsinki on 7 
June 2011. The authors are members of the Centre.
3 Bram Akkermans – Eveline Ramaekers, »Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Mean­
ings and Interpretations», European Law Journal 2010, 292–314. Akkermans and Ramaekers 
delivered a keynote presentation based on their study at the seminar mentioned in n. 2 above.
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process, as well as the meaning of the article in Europe’s multilingual context. 
The former issue is discussed in the present section, the latter in section 2.2.
The first step in attempting to understand this provision is to explain why a 
provision on property was included in the Treaties in the first place. Following 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s opinion in what perhaps should be 
considered the core cases of the Golden Shares saga,4 Akkermans and Ramae­
kers trace the basic content of Article 345 TFEU back to the Schuman Declara­
tion.5 For reasons which are not evident, they mainly focus on Article 222 TEEC 
and its different language versions in their inquiry into the content that the draft­
ers intended to give to the provision. However, the question of the intended 
content cannot be answered without first exploring the reasons behind its inclu­
sion in the Schuman Declaration and in Article 83 TECSC.
The Schuman Declaration mentioned that establishing the High Authority, 
a supranational administrative body, would not prejudge the regime of owner­
ship of undertakings.6 In order to understand this statement it is important to 
recall the political context of the time. After the Second World War, the French 
authorities were concerned about the possible rearmament of Germany, while 
on the other side of the border the German people were trying to recover their 
dignity having accepted responsibility for past events. Showing them no mercy 
could have jeopardized their repentance and created a breeding ground for a 
renewed and potentially dangerous nationalism. As a result, the first steps in the 
European integration process were based on a delicate balance between the 
French wish to somehow monitor German industrial potential and Germany’s 
need to regain its own dignity.7
One of the elements in restoring Germany’s dignity was its ability, as a state, 
to recover control over its industries. As a matter of fact, in occupied Germany, 
Law 75 of the British and American forces had already reorganised the coal and 
steel companies and established, against the opinion of the French,8 a »commit­
4 Joined opinion to the Court of the Advocate General in Cases C­367/98 Commission of 
the European Communities v Portuguese Republic [2002] ECR I­04731, C­483/99 Commission 
of the European Communities v French Republic [2002] ECR I­04781, and C­503/99 Commis-
sion of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium [2002] ECR I­04809.
5 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 296.
6 The language of the Declaration was French: »L’institution de la Haute Autorité ne préjuge 
en rien du régime de propriété des entreprises.»
7 See the recurrent mentions of this idea in Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Librairie Gené­
rale Française 2007), particularly in chapters XI to XV.
8 Charles de Gaulle reportedly considered this as »the gravest decision made so far during 
the 20th century», since it was not clear what the stance of the German state towards Russia 
and communism was. See »Gen. de Gaulle fears Germany to back reds», Kentucky New Era, 
17 November 1948 (digitalized version available at: http://news.google.com/
newspapers?nid=0N­VGjzr574C&dat=19481117&printsec=frontpage&hl=en, last visited on 
17 February 2011).
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ment to re­privatize Ruhr industry»,9 thus devolving competence over the rules 
concerning the property of the factories to the German government.10 It is true 
that the main aim of this measure was to clarify which assets were German 
property and thus available to be used for paying war damages,11 but once the 
ownership of companies had been devolved to the German state, all measures 
proposing any control by French authorities over German industry were pushed 
off the agenda.
The French remained suspicious and uneasy about the potential of German 
industry, particularly due to the decisive influence of certain industrial groups 
considered as accomplices to Nazism and its policy of aggression. Only a gen­
eral and abstract rule applicable to all countries without exception would be 
accepted in order to keep the neighbour’s rearmament under control. This was 
realised via an antitrust policy of universal character imported from the United 
States,12 which would be supervised and implemented by the High Authority. 
The statement in the Schuman Declaration, according to which the estab­
lishment of the High Authority would not prejudge the regime of ownership of 
undertakings,13 was the first formulation of what later became Article 345 TFEU. 
This statement served several purposes. First and foremost, it sought to separate 
the proposed Community from the unsolved and highly sensitive political issue 
of property rights over the Saarland collieries and the Ruhr mines.14 The aim of 
the TECSC was not to resolve this conflict, but to pool the coal and steel indus­
tries despite its existence. In addition, the statement demarcated the powers of 
the projected Community. That is, even though resources were to be pooled and 
the High Authority would plan the development of the sector, the Treaty would 
not affect national regulations on property. Thus, different conceptions of market 
economy would fit in the proposed system.15 
9 Helge Berger – Albrecht Ritschl, »Germany and the political economy of the Marshall 
Plan, 1947–52: a re­revisionist view», in Barry Eichengreen (ed.), Europe’s Post­War Recovery 
(New York: Cambridge University Press 1995), 219.
10 Reorganization of German Coal and Iron and Steel Industries, Military Government – 
Germany, U.S. Zone of Control Law No. 75 of November 10, 1948, Department of State Bul-
letin, Vol. 19 (1948), 704.
11 The issue of what was not German property was equally important, especially in the 
cases of German companies established in foreign countries or foreign companies established 
in Germany. Even more problematic were the instances of German shareholders in foreign 
companies or foreign shareholders in German companies. On these technical but central issues, 
see Martin Domke, »The Control of Corporations. Application of the Enemy Test in the United 
States of America», The International Law Quarterly 1950, 52–59. 
12 Wyatt Wells, Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World (New York: Columbia 
University Press 2002).
13 For the exact wording, see n. 6 above.
14 Paul Reuter, La Communauté Europeénne du Charbon et de l’Acier (Paris: LGDJ 1953), 
146.
15 This was explicitly recognised by Paul Reuter, legal adviser to Schuman and Monnet dur­
ing the negotiations for the TECSC: »une des conséquences importantes de la variété des types 
de propriété va être, dans la Communauté, le fonctionnement d’un marché concurrentiel qui 
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This statement had an implicit and additional content, since it also signified 
that the new Community would under no circumstance have the power to na­
tionalise companies. It must be recalled that such power is a major expression 
of the monopoly of legitimate force which defines a state.16 Therefore, when 
ratifying the TECSC, Member States were not conferring this key attribute of 
their sovereignty on the High Authority. All these reasons lay behind the codi­
fication of this statement as one of the general and final provisions of the Treaty 
(Article 83).17
A subsequent question is why this provision was maintained, albeit with a 
different formulation, when economic integration in more general terms was 
negotiated some years later. Were the original reasons behind it, related to the 
particular conditions of the coal and steel industries and to certain politically 
sensitive issues, also valid with respect to broader economic integration? It 
should be noted that Article 83 TECSC explicitly mentioned as the object of the 
provision the undertakings subject to the provisions of this Treaty, whereas the 
new Article 222 TEEC referred to the system of property ownership in Member 
States.18 This suggests that a more general provision was needed for the new step 
in European integration. Perhaps this was a broader claim against conferral of 
any power to nationalise.19 Be that as it may, no convincing answer as to why 
the provision was maintained can be given due to the simplistic account of the 
drafting process in the travaux préparatoires and the lack of literature.20
It is still possible to answer related questions, such as what were the content 
and scope of the provision. However, the explanation provided by Akkermans 
and Ramaekers is not fully satisfactory in this regard. In short, they argue that 
despite the change of wording in Article 222 TEEC, the content of the provision 
remained the same as in Article 83 TECSC, particularly regarding its object.21 
According to their interpretation, removing the reference to undertakings from 
opposera des entreprises purement capitalistes, des sociétés d’économie mixte, des entreprises 
nationalisées, et des affaires, sous toutes les dormes juridiques imaginables, sans omettre la 
co­gestion allemande. Le fonctionnement correct du marché commun opérera dans ces condi­
tions la démonstration d’une affirmation théorique aussi évidente que méconnue dans les mi­
lieux politiques, à savoir que l’économie de marché n’est pas liée directement à l’organisation 
du droit de propriété». Reuter 1953, 146–147. Cf. Helen Papaconstantinou, Free Trade and 
Competition in the EEC. Law Policy and Practice (London: Routledge 1998), 4.
16 According to Max Weber, a state can be defined as »the human community that, within a 
defined territory … (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate force for itself». Max 
Weber, Max Weber’s Complete Writings on Academic and Political Vocations (New York: 
Algora Publishing 2008), 156 (emphasis in the original).
17 The wording of its single original version (French) was: »L’institution de la Commun­
auté ne préjuge en rien le régime de propriété des entreprises soumises aux dispositions du 
présent traité.»
18 The French wording of the provision was: »Le présent traité ne préjuge en rien le régime 
de la propriété dans les États membres.»
19 On the issue, see section 3.2 below.
20 See Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 300.
21 Ibid., 302.
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the formulation of the provision did not change its content. This counter­intui­
tive interpretation, which restricts the scope of the article despite its wording, 
ought to be supported by stronger arguments than those which have come to the 
fore so far.
2.2. The Meaning of the Article in a Multilingual Context
In order to elucidate the meaning of the provision of Article 345 TFEU, Akker­
mans and Ramaekers also carry out a comparison between its different language 
versions. Article 83 TECSC was written in French, which was its sole official 
language, whereas the Treaty of Rome (EEC and the European Atomic Energy 
Community) was written in four language versions, all considered authentic. 
Therefore, interpreting the provisions of Article 222 TEEC and its subsequent 
incarnations depends on the content of all the versions, as the authors correctly 
explain. Furthermore, since they wrote the results of their research in English, 
it is understandable that the authors compare all the original versions with the 
English one. Yet, in terms of rigour of research it would have been more appro­
priate to study the four original versions first and only then proceed to compare 
them with the English one. This would have made it more evident that what used 
to be a uniform interpretation according to the first versions became a more 
dubious one after the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the EEC in 1973. The 
reason for this was that the French term préjuge was translated into English as 
prejudice, while its meaning is prejudge. Even though Akkermans and Ramae­
kers doubt this translation, they consider to what extent it is possible to adapt 
the wording of the English version to the meaning of the other language ver­
sions.22
Nevertheless, some additional research is needed. Once such a difference 
between versions has been detected, and bearing in mind that all language ver­
sions are of the same value when interpreting the Treaties, the next step should 
be to examine whether and to what extent the English version embodied a vol­
untary change in the Treaty contents. If the answer was affirmative, later ver­
sions of the Treaties, corresponding to further accessions, would also include 
this nuance in the meaning of the present Article 345 TFEU. However, neither 
the Spanish and Portuguese versions (from the 1986 enlargement), nor the Finn­
ish and Polish ones (from the 1995 and 2004 enlargements, respectively) differ 
from the original drafting.23 This suggests that it was not the intention of the 
Member States, in accepting the English prejudice instead of prejudge, to mod­
ify the content of the Treaties.
22 Ibid., 298.
23 Not all the language versions have been checked, but the four mentioned in the text seem 
representative and adequate enough for the purpose of what is to be proved.
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Therefore, resulting from interpretation of the provision according to all 
authentic language versions as well as from the fact that prejudice is not a cor­
rect translation of préjuger, it may be concluded that despite the literal wording 
of the English version the article should be interpreted as meaning prejudge.24 
Akkermans and Ramaekers arrive at a similar but not fully equivalent conclu­
sion: »when compared to the original four language versions, it can be under­
stood that the expression ‘shall in no way prejudice’ refers to the neutral stance 
that is taken by the EU with regard to the way in which Member States regulate 
their system of property ownership».25 It seems that in their view, mere neutral­
ity of European institutions towards national systems of property is enough to 
respect fully the mandate of the article.26 However, this interpretation can be 
questioned for two reasons. First, when making such a statement, they seem to 
establish a link between not prejudicing and neutrality, a step in their reasoning 
which is difficult to justify according to any language version of the Treaties. As 
a matter of fact, if the provision is interpreted as meaning prejudge, the gap 
between its actual wording and the way they interpret it is even wider. Second, 
neutral supranational rules may treat equally what in substance are unequal 
forms of property. Thus, applying the same rationale to both public and private 
undertakings could lead to ignoring the fundamental differences between them.27
3. Article 345 TFEU and the Europeanisation of Property Law
3.1. The Need for a Clear Interpretation
The vague wording of Article 345 TFEU and its predecessors has caused con­
siderable confusion with respect to property law, and continues to do so. Some 
scholars maintain that this provision is meant wholly or partially to exclude 
property law from EU competence,28 whereas others argue that it merely safe­
24 This interpretation is in accordance with the CILFIT doctrine (Case 283/81, CILFIT 
[1982] ECR 3415), mentioned in Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 294. 
25 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 298 (emphasis added).
26 As a matter of fact, they state that »Article 345 TFEU excludes application of the Treaty 
to the question whether these undertakings are held in private ownership – by shareholders – or 
in public ownership – by a Member State government». Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 303. 
27 Danny Nicol argues that this has already happened in the European integration process: 
»the Commission, when examining a particular operation under the rules on state aid, must 
neither prejudice nor favour public undertakings. Aid granted to public undertakings must 
therefore be subject to the same rules applying to all forms of aid granted by the Member States. 
Yet the effect of non­discriminatory treatment is to deprive public ownership of its potential 
for distinctiveness and of its useful purpose.» See Danny Nicol, The Constitutional Protection 
of Capitalism (Oxford – Portland: Hart 2010), 118.
28 José Caramelo-Gomes, »Unification in the Field of Property Law from the Perspective of 
European Law», in Wolfgang Faber – Brigitta Lurger (eds), Rules for the Transfer of Movables. 
A Candidate for European Harmonisation or National Reforms? (Munich: Sellier. European 
Law Publishers 2008), 241–247.
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guards Member State competence to nationalise or privatise property.29 The lat­
ter view seems to have become prevalent in the literature.30 Whatever the right 
interpretation, the provision has not prevented European legislation or adjudica­
tion on matters that touch upon or directly concern property law. Examples of 
such legislation include Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of unlawfully removed 
cultural objects, Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, and 
Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements. The European Court 
of Justice (ECJ)31 has entered the domain of property law in several cases on 
internal market freedoms.32
However, the provision has caused controversy in the EU legislative process. 
Perhaps the best­known example is the enactment of Directive 2000/35/EC on 
combating late payment in commercial transactions. As a part of this project, an 
attempt was made to harmonise the enforceability of simple retention of title 
clauses against third parties. This would have been a long­awaited reform. All 
the same, it failed due to Article 295 TEC (now 345 TFEU). According to 
Michael Milo, mere mention of this article seems to have prevented serious 
discussion of how the property law aspects of retention of title should be dealt 
with. This took place at the level of the Council, as a result of legal service de­
partment advice that the proposed provision on retention of title might contra­
vene Article 295 TEC. Milo is very likely right in suggesting that the article was 
misused by this deus ex machina application.33
In order to prevent further misuses, be they either unfounded avoidance of 
legislative activity or overstepping competence, the interpretation of Article 345 
TFEU needs to be clarified. This exercise is worthwhile since some property law 
related problems in cross­border trade and finance seem to be solvable only at 
a transnational level, a likely candidate for such a level being the European one. 
The study by Akkermans and Ramaekers is an important step towards a better 
understanding of the article’s provision. Interestingly, Akkermans and Ramae­
kers conclude that Article 345 TFEU does not form an obstacle to the develop­
ment of a European property law, that is, unification or harmonisation efforts in 
29 Jacobien W. Rutgers, International Reservation of Title Clauses. A Study of Dutch, French 
and German Private International Law in the Light of European Law (The Hague: T.M.C. As­
ser Press 1999), 175–176.
30 Eva-Maria Kieninger, »Introduction», in Eva­Maria Kieninger (ed.), Security Rights in 
Movable Property in European Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 
21–22; J.M. Milo, »Combating Late Payment in Business Transactions: How a New European 
Directive Has Failed to Set a Substantive Minimum Regarding National Provisions on Reten­
tion of Title», European Review of Private Law 2003, 383–384.
31 Hereinafter, the term ECJ refers to the Court of Justice (European Union’s highest court 
of law) and all its predecessors.
32 For a comprehensive account of emerging European property law, see Sjef van Erp – Bram 
Akkermans, »European Union property law», in Christian Twigg­Flesner (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to European Union Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 
174–185.
33 Milo 2003, 385.
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this field.34 Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below briefly discuss two of their central argu­
ments on the scope of the article. These arguments are particularly relevant for 
Europeanisation of property law, and they seem to give rise to some reservations. 
Then, section 3.4 considers the implications that these reservations may have 
for interpretation of the article.
3.2. Is the Scope of the Article Limited to Ownership of Undertakings?
Akkermans and Ramaekers argue that the reference in Article 345 TFEU to the 
system of property ownership should be interpreted as concerning only the own­
ership of undertakings. Thus, the article would merely establish the so­called 
neutrality principle, according to which the EU does not concern itself with 
whether undertakings are held in public or private ownership.35 This principle 
entails that decisions on the nationalisation or privatisation of undertakings fall 
within the Member States’ exclusive competence, albeit that this competence 
has to be used in conformity with internal market freedoms and competition law. 
Akkermans and Ramaekers support this interpretation with archival findings 
concerning the negotiations for the TEEC (1955 to 1957). They point out that 
the last text version before the final text of Article 222 TEEC (later 295 TEC, 
now 345 TFEU) included a qualification that limited the scope of the article to 
the ownership of undertakings. Furthermore, they believe that removal of this 
qualification for the final text was not intended to change the scope of the article. 
Therefore, in their view, Article 345 should also be interpreted as if the qualifi­
cation was still in its provision.36
This interpretation leaves room for doubt because, as Akkermans and Ra­
maekers admit, it is unknown why the qualification was removed. The travaux 
préparatoires only reveal the different text versions and their chronological or­
der. Akkermans and Ramaekers consider it significant that the qualification was 
removed at a meeting of the Heads of Delegation, and not at an intergovernmen­
tal conference at political level. They see this as an indication of the insignifi­
cance of the removal.37 It is questionable, however, whether this conclusion can 
be drawn. After all, the motives behind this change, and who came up with it or 
commissioned it, cannot be deduced from the archival material.
Indeed, it is possible that the qualification was removed with a view to 
broadening the scope of the article beyond mere ownership of undertakings. It 
is well established that the Member States’ main concern with respect to Article 
34 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 313–314.
35 For criticism of this view, see section 2.2 above.
36 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 299–302.
37 Ibid., 300.
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222 TEEC was their competence to nationalise property.38 Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the Member States would have wanted to limit the provision safe­
guarding their competence to nationalise property to ownership of undertakings, 
and not to let it concern other property rights of similar importance.
Moreover, it is known that the text version before the one with the qualifica­
tion concerning ownership of undertakings included, instead, a qualification 
concerning ownership of means of production.39 This may give a hint as to why 
the qualification concerning ownership of undertakings was eventually removed. 
That is, the qualification concerning ownership of undertakings may have been 
seen as narrower than the one concerning ownership of means of production. 
Consider an example where an undertaking owns infrastructure or other assets 
that the undertaking’s home Member State considers strategically important and 
wants to nationalise, without being interested in nationalising the undertaking 
as such. It seems clear that this nationalisation would lie within the scope of a 
qualification concerning means of production, whereas the same might not hold 
true for a qualification concerning ownership of undertakings. Thus, the quali­
fication concerning ownership of undertakings may have been removed so as to 
broaden the scope of the article back to what it would have been with the qual­
ification concerning ownership of means of production, or even broader.
3.3. Is the Right of Ownership Excluded from the Scope of the Article?
Akkermans and Ramaekers also argue that the expression system of property 
ownership does not refer to the right of ownership itself, but only to the way in 
which ownership is held, that is, to the question of public or private ownership. 
Accordingly, in their view, the content and objects of ownership are excluded 
from the scope of Article 345 TFEU. They support this with their impression 
that it is uncommon in property law to speak of a system of ownership, and that 
a formulation leaving out the word system would immediately give the article a 
different meaning for a property lawyer.40
This argument is not beyond question either. First, it may not be helpful to 
assess the wording of the article only on the basis of typical property law par­
lance because an article in a European treaty is an atypical context for that kind 
of parlance, which indeed is often very nationally­oriented. Akkermans and 
Ramaekers do recognise one common use for the expression system of property 
ownership, namely, defining the different types of ownership, such as fragmen­
tary or unitary concepts of ownership. This remark may actually offer a key to 
38 Daniela Caruso, »Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: the Case of 
Property», European Law Journal 2004, 755–756; Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 302.
39 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 300.
40 Ibid., 302–304.
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an alternative interpretation. In a treaty context, a reference to a system of prop­
erty ownership could be understood as taking a comparative stance, thus recog­
nising the differences between the various concepts of ownership, and as affirm­
ing that all of these concepts are accommodated in what the article prescribes. 
Second, and more importantly, the right of ownership itself can, and should, 
be understood as a system. Concepts of ownership always conceal complex 
systems of norms and normative relations, and a particular concept of ownership 
can only be understood by viewing the relevant norms and normative relations 
in a systematic, organised way. An organised picture of these normative relations 
can be formed, for example, with the help of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s »fun­
damental legal conceptions», which also makes the different concepts of owner­
ship commensurable.41 An extreme version of the idea of ownership as a system 
was presented by Alf Ross, a leading Scandinavian realist. According to Ross, 
the word ownership is a mere systematic connection between a group of condi­
tioning facts (facts that »create ownership») and a group of legal consequences 
(consequences that »ownership entails»). Generally, he thought of ownership as 
an empty word which has no semantic reference and which only serves the 
purpose of presentation.42
In the light of the foregoing, the expression system of property ownership 
could be understood, on linguistic grounds, as a reference to the right of owner­
ship itself. However, knowing the article’s purpose regarding Member State 
competence to nationalise property, the scope has to cover the ways in which 
ownership can be held. Regardless of that, it seems unnecessary to exclude the 
right of ownership from the idea of a system of property ownership. Quite the 
contrary, the right of ownership could be thought of as the nucleus of such a 
system.
Third, the negotiators for the TEEC may have been aware that the way in 
which the concept of ownership is understood may have consequences for po­
litical decision making concerning ownership. An example of such consequen­
ces can be taken from the memoirs of Tage Erlander, a social democrat and 
Sweden’s long­time prime minister. He describes how Scandinavian realism 
broke down the old natural law based unitary concept of ownership, and how 
this altered Swedish socialist politics during the first half of the 20th century.
The unitary concept of ownership was split into several partial concepts, 
each of which could acquire new content as a consequence of societal interven­
tion. It became possible to change, or even to repeal, an isolated aspect of own­
ership by a decision of the government or other organisation, while leaving the 
other aspects unaffected. The question of who should be the formal owner lost 
41 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, »Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning», Yale Law Journal 1913, 28–58.
42 Alf Ross, »Tû­tû», Harvard Law Review 1957, 818–821.
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some of its importance, and consequently socialisation lost its dominant position 
in socialist theory and became a matter of mere expediency.43
Of course, this is not to suggest that the negotiators knew about these devel­
opments. However, they may have recognised that the technicalities and the 
politics of ownership are not strictly separate matters. This, then, could be seen 
as an indication of Member State incentives to include such technicalities (the 
features of the right of ownership itself) in the scope of the article.
3.4. An Open-ended but Clarified Interpretation
The study by Akkermans and Ramaekers shows that the question of public or 
private ownership of undertakings belongs to the core of the scope of Article 
345 TFEU. Yet, as sections 3.2 and 3.3 above suggest, it is still unknown wheth­
er that is also the whole of the scope. Thus, for the time being, it seems necessary 
to accept that interpretation of the article remains to some extent open­ended.
It can perhaps be safely assumed that the article is meant to leave some 
sphere of political­economic decision making to the Member States’ exclusive 
competence. The sphere’s limits are difficult to define, though. An attempt to 
outline these limits could be based on the assumption that the Member States’ 
exclusive competence can pertain only to matters of at least similar magnitude 
(public importance) to those concerning the question of public or private owner­
ship of undertakings. When it comes to the harmonisation efforts necessary in 
order to secure the proper functioning of the internal market, this clarification 
should be sufficient. This is the case because hardly any such efforts could be 
caught by the article.
This interpretation can be supported by Brigitta Lurger’s observation that 
property law is in many respects similar, and related, to contract law. According 
to Lurger, it cannot really be said that one is more public or political than the 
other.44 If this holds true, it becomes hard to explain why Article 345 TFEU 
should give reason to any exceptionalism regarding property law. 
With respect to negative harmonisation, as Akkermans and Ramaekers sug­
gest, the ECJ would probably apply the dichotomy between existence and exer­
cise developed in its case law on intellectual property rights.45 In the context of 
positive harmonisation, Article 345 TFEU might become, at best, something 
similar to what Daniela Caruso calls a promise of collective reflection in private 
43 Tage Erlander, 1901–1939 (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag 1972), 125–126. See Toni Malmi-
nen, »So You Thought Transplanting Law Is Easy? Fear of Scandinavian Legal Realism in 
Finland, 1918–1965», in Jaakko Husa – Kimmo Nuotio – Heikki Pihlajamäki (eds), Nordic 
Law – Between Tradition and Dynamism (Antwerp – Oxford: Intersentia 2007), 80–81.
44 Brigitta Lurger, »Political Issues in Property Law and European Unification Projects», in 
Martijn W. Hesselink (ed.), The Politics of a European Civil Code (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International 2006), 52.
45 Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 310–311. See also section 5.2 below.
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law matters of public significance, or in other words, a promise that the dis­
tributive implications of harmonisation will be made visible and discussed.46 In 
this role, the article could serve the legitimacy of law making.47
4. Article 345 TFEU and Competition Law Provisions
4.1. The Basic Relationship is Simple
Akkermans and Ramaekers suggest that Article 345 TFEU shows that EU law 
is neutral concerning the question of public or private ownership of an undertak­
ing but that, nevertheless, nationalisation must be in conformity with internal 
market law, and especially competition law (as understood broadly).48 It is a 
well­known fact that, for instance, EU competition law prohibitions against 
competition­restricting contracts and abuse of a dominant market position apply 
to all undertakings offering goods on a market. In addition, an actor, even when 
publicly owned or acting in the public interest, may easily be perceived as an 
undertaking engaged in economic activity.49 As Akkermans and Ramaekers’ 
view can be sustained and adopted as a starting point, the following is intended 
to provide a more elaborate discussion on the relationship between EU compe­
tition law and Article 345 TFEU. Attention is paid both to the »core of competi­
tion law», that is, the prohibitions laid out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well 
as to law on state aid, public procurement and merger control. The last three in 
particular, however, are not dealt with in detail.
4.2. EU Competition Law Prohibitions and Article 345 TFEU
Regardless of Article 345 TFEU (whoever may own companies) the application 
of EU competition law (how companies must behave) is not precluded. Even if 
Article 345 TFEU is mainly understood as a statement about the neutrality of 
the EU approach regarding state or private owning of undertakings as such, it 
can be noted that the choice allowed by Article 345 TFEU does not change the 
fact that the actions of Member State­owned or public companies are, similarly 
to the actions of any undertakings, strongly regulated by the EU. An actor re­
46 To some degree, this promise would address Lurger’s plea that, before deciding on unifi­
cation of property law, the political and social issues at stake in this field should be thoroughly 
assessed. See Lurger 2006, 53–54.
47 Caruso 2004, 765.
48 See Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 314 and passim.
49 See further, for instance Ivo Van Bael – Jean-François Bellis, Competition Law of the 
European Community. Fifth Edition, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer 2010), 17–21. On 
the exception in Article 106(2) TFEU see also, for instance, D.G. Goyder – Joanna Goyder – 
Albertina Albors-Llorens, Goyder’s EC Competition Law. Fifth Edition, (Oxford: Oxford Uni­
versity Press 2009), 562–569.
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garded as part of the state can thus be found to have participated in a cartel, or, 
which is significantly more common, to have abused its dominant market posi­
tion.
Moreover, regardless of the existence of Article 345 TFEU, the acceptabil­
ity of private companies’ market behaviour in the Member States is, of course, 
subject to evaluation under EU competition law. Thus the ways in which assets 
are used in the Member States are everything but issues belonging to the exclu­
sive legislative competence of the Member States. It is noteworthy that the 
threshold for application of EU competition law is low and based on the poten­
tial effect of behaviour on trade between Member States – this possible effect 
being very often present.50 
On the basis of case law at the EU level, it is clear that Article 345 TFEU 
cannot be relied on to escape the prohibitions against competition­restricting 
contracts and against abuse of a dominant market position. Furthermore, appar­
ently no fields of economic activity would be generally exempted from the ap­
plicability of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU on the basis of Article 345 TFEU. 
In contrast, the EU courts have explicitly rejected attempts to justify competi­
tion­restricting behaviour by using the former Article 295 TEC (or its predeces­
sor), for instance, with respect to intellectual property rights51 and rights to 
concrete objects such as freezers.52 It is noteworthy that in the ECJ’s considera­
tions, Article 345 TFEU does not obviously affect the reasoning on applicabil­
ity of EU competition law.53
4.3. The State and the Markets
Article 106(2) TFEU sets out a rule that exempts certain actions of a public 
benefit nature from the scope of EU competition law prohibitions. These actions 
encompass the market behaviour of undertakings entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest or having the character of a fiscal mo­
nopoly if the application of competition rules would obstruct performance of the 
particular tasks. However, the exception is of narrow applicability.54 Further­
50 Moreover, even the content of national competition law provisions is also restricted by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
51 See Joined cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 00299.
52 See case T­65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [2003] ECR II­04653. See also the 
opinion of Advocate General Cosmas in case C­344/98 Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream [2000] 
ECR I­11371, paras 105–106. 
53 See also Peter Oliver, »Competition and Free Movement: Their Place in the Treaty», in 
Takis Tridimas – Paolisa Nebbia (eds) European Union Law for the Twenty­First Century. 
Rethinking the New Legal Order, volume 2. Internal Market and Free Movement Community 
Policies. (Oxford – Portland: Hart Publishing 2004), 172–173.
54 See, on Article 106(2) TFEU (former Article 86(2) EC), for instance Van Bael – Bellis 
2010, 921–952.
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more, broadenings of the scope of the 106(2) exemption by means of invoking 
Article 345 TFEU are presumably just not possible.55 Acceptable ways of use of 
state­owned assets – and situations where exceptions are allowed – are from the 
competition law point of view exhaustively dealt with by Articles 106 and 101–
102 TFEU. Considering Member States or their derivatives acting on markets, 
the space left for them by Article 345 TFEU seems rather insignificant from the 
point of view of EU regulation of economic activity. 
To move on from economic activity pursued by states, it may also be asked 
if EU competition law hurdles may exist even for merely legislating on systems 
of property ownership in the Member States. Whether – and in what circum­
stances – a Member State can be found to have infringed EU competition law 
prohibitions just by maintaining legislation in effect, that is, acting in its official 
function and not as an undertaking engaged in economic activity, is an interest­
ing question. After all, the recognised scope of the prohibitions laid down in 
Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU concerns undertakings. 
Szyszczak has discussed the issue by evaluating the functions of competition 
law prohibitions and Article 28 TEC (now Article 34 TFEU).56 On the basis of 
her analysis it would appear that the maxim of »EU markets should be com­
petitive» or a similar principle behind the prohibitions against competition­re­
stricting contracts and abuse of a dominant market position may well be in­
fringed by national law, but the problem would not necessarily be tackled via 
competition law prohibitions. Instead, Article 28 TEC (or nowadays, Article 34 
TFEU) may be, or may have been, used due to its different nature and better 
suitability to challenge the law of a Member State. However, Szyszczak points 
out that this may be problematic since discrimination as an element of applying 
Article 28 TEC (34 TFEU) is difficult to construct in these cases.57 
Nevertheless, a significant line of case law also approaches the »EU markets 
should be competitive» maxim referring to competition law prohibitions and 
55 See also Grith Skovgaard Ølykke, »The Definition of a ‘Contract’ Under Article 106 
TFEU», in Erika Szyszczak – Jim Davies – Mads Andenæs – Tarjei Bekkedal (eds) Develop­
ments in Services of General Interest. Legal Issues of Services of General Interest. Part 1. (The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press 2011),107, footnote 17, intriguingly approaching Article 345 TFEU 
as suggesting that public undertakings do not need special attention (compared to other under­
takings) under Article 106(1) TFEU (on undertakings that have been granted special or exclu­
sive rights). This approach shows that Article 345 TFEU may be read as a message that EU 
competition law applies equally to all undertakings precisely because of the choices left for the 
Member States under Article 345 TFEU. 
56 Erika Szyszczak, »State Intervention and the Internal Market», in Takis Tridimas – Paoli­
sa Nebbia (eds) European Union Law for the Twenty­First Century. Rethinking the New Legal 
Order. Volume 2. Internal Market and Free Movement Community Policies. (Oxford – Port­
land: Hart Publishing 2004), 217–238. 
57 See Szyszczak 2004, 222–225 and, for instance, case 181/82 Roussel Laboratoria BV and 
others v État néerlandais [1983] ECR 03849. See also Kamiel Mortelmans, »Towards Conver­
gence in the Application of the Rules on Free Movement and on Competition?» in Common 
Market Law Review 38 2001, 631–635.
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recognising the intertwinement of former Articles 3(1)(g) TEC and 10 TEC (or 
their predecessors), free movement, and competition law provisions.58 Hence the 
ECJ shows that prohibitions against competition restrictions bind the Member 
States not only when they participate in economic activity through their units or 
publicly owned companies, but also regarding acting in the official function of 
the state, as tools to further the internal market – a goal that imposes obligations 
on the Member States by virtue of the Treaties.59 No complete equivalent60 exists 
for Article 3(1)(g) TEC in the new Treaty system, but Article 4(3) TEU sets out 
the principle of sincere cooperation, formerly covered by Article 10 TEC.61
From the point of view of undertakings, the possibility of state­imposed 
obligations to act contrary to EU competition law has been recognised in case 
law as a possible justification for breaches by undertakings of EU competition 
law prohibitions.62 Even if competition infringing behaviour is thus exception­
ally allowed for undertakings, the Member State in question may face legal 
consequences for its own infringement. Hence, the activities allowed to Member 
States by Article 345 TFEU – whatever the scope of these activities is perceived 
to be – may be restricted by EU competition law combined with the obligation 
to facilitate the establishment and furthering of the internal market.
EU competition law, as understood broadly, also restricts Member State 
interference in the markets and private economic activity through strict rules on 
acceptable state aid and on public procurement. Both fields of law are based on 
the idea of the state’s ability to significantly disturb the effective competitive 
process on the markets. As a remarkable and well­financed actor, the state could 
protect national champions – undermining efforts to create a functioning internal 
market in the EU. When it comes to public procurement, abuse of a dominant 
position on the buyer side of the markets is pre­emptively prevented by legisla­
tion on procurement procedures. Concerning both state aid and public procure­
58 See case 13/77 SA G.B. Inno B. M. v ATAB [1977], ECR 02115; case C­2/91, Meng [1993] 
ECR I­05751; case C­35/96 Commission v Italian Republic [1998] ECR I­03851; case C­198/01 
CIF v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato [2003] ECR I­08055; case C­338/09 
Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetriebs GmbH v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR 0000 (not yet 
published), paras 25–26. See also an extensive analysis by Van Bael – Bellis 2010, 882–896.
59 According to Article 3(1)(g) TEC, the activities of the Community include a system ensur­
ing that competition in the internal market is not distorted. According to Article 10 TEC, the 
Member States must take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by the in­
stitutions of the Community. The Member States must also facilitate the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks and they must abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attain­
ment of the objectives of the Treaty (consolidated text, OJ C 321E of 29 December 2006).
60 See, however, Article 3(3) TEU and Protocol 27 on internal market and competition.
61 Also Article 4(3) TEU has already been referred to in the context of Member States’ ob­
ligations and EU competition provisions, see case C­338/09 Yellow Cab Verkehrsbetriebs 
GmbH v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] ECR 0000 (not yet published), paras 25–26. 
62 Undertakings may not, however, automatically justify anti­competitive behaviour by, for 
example, referring to the fact that the national authorities were aware of the behaviour and 
allowed it. On state compulsion and similar doctrines, see Van Bael – Bellis 2010, 47–52.
Property and European Integration: Dimensions of Article 345 TFEU 219
ment law, it is notable that the existence of a real business risk and thus, the 
possibility to fail and go bankrupt is also protected by the same legislation. 
Failing firms are a natural phenomenon on markets and a part of the desired 
competitive process in the EU. 
4.4. Merger Control and Article 345 TFEU
Interestingly, it seems that EU merger control, which frequently results in Com­
mission decisions on whether it is acceptable for a certain undertaking to buy 
another undertaking (and which also precludes application of national law by 
the Member State and prevents clearance of a merger based on national law in 
a national procedure),63 has not been actively discussed in the context of Article 
345 TFEU. However, Akkermans and Ramaekers’ interpretation, which is also 
a generally understandable reading of Article 345 TFEU, may be perceived as a 
key point when it is argued that Article 345 TFEU and EU competition law on 
mergers are compatible with each other. That interpretation emphasises that 
Article 345 TFEU allows differences in systems of property ownership while 
staying silent on EU interference in property ownership or the right to property 
as such.
Nevertheless, under merger control competition law, mere acquisition of 
another undertaking may be prevented without requiring detection of actual 
anticompetitive behaviour or anticompetitive intent on the markets. The question 
of who owns companies is exactly the point on which merger control law turns.64 
EU merger control rules are, in a way, a significant restriction on Member States’ 
ability to legislate on issues remarkably close to systems of property ownership, 
that is, regarding the characteristics of such a system, like the marketability of 
shares. 
5. Article 345 TFEU as a Limitation on Application of Competition 
Law to Intellectual Property Rights?
5.1. Intellectual Property Rights as a Defence in Competition law
Objections to competition law intervention are sometimes raised on the grounds 
that since the challenged conduct is covered by intellectual property rights, ap­
plication of competition law is not appropriate.
63 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between un­
dertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), at recitals 17–18 and passim.
64 Compare with legislation and case law on abuse of a dominant market position: it is com­
pletely acceptable to gain an increasingly significant market share. A dominant position itself 
is not prohibited, only certain behaviour by a dominant undertaking.
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This section considers such intellectual property right related defences 
based on Article 345 TFEU.65 It is argued that Article 345 TFEU and concepts 
reflecting it do not generally play a decisive role as a defence to competition law 
violations. This is because the substantive standards for establishing a violation 
of competition law generally suffice for avoiding conflicts with Article 345 
TFEU and, in fact, are more desirable for striking an appropriate balance be­
tween competition and intellectual property policies.
5.2. Direct Application and Reflections of Article 345 TFEU
It is occasionally argued that Article 345 TFEU would be infringed by applying 
competition law to limit the ability of intellectual property rights holders to 
exercise their rights. For instance, in Consten & Grundig v Commission it was 
argued (unsuccessfully) that a Commission decision that enjoined use of a na­
tional trade mark to restrict parallel imports violated Article 345.66 In relation to 
intellectual property rights, Article 345 TFEU has also been (unsuccessfully) 
invoked in actions concerning interim measures to protect copyright in IMS 
65 Defences based on, for example, breach of international obligations concerning intellec­
tual property rights are sometimes also raised, but are beyond the scope of this paper. See, for 
example, Case T­201/04, Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR­II 3601, paras 777–813 (reject­
ing Microsoft’s argument that Article 13 of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement would have been vio­
lated by the European Commission decision to require the company to share interoperability 
information); Case T­289/01 Duales System Deutschland [2007] ECR­II 1691, paras 180–192 
(rejecting allegations that remedies for an abuse were disproportionate in view of the principles 
reflected by, for instance, Article 21 of the WTO/TRIPS Agreement).
66 Consten & Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 345–346. The Court reasoned: »Ar­
ticle 222 confines itself to stating that the ‘Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Mem­
ber States governing the system of property ownership’. The injunction contained in Article 3 
of the operative part of the contested decision to refrain from using rights under national trade­
mark law in order to set an obstacle in the way of parallel imports does not affect the grant of 
those rights but only limits their exercise to the extent necessary to give effect to the prohibition 
under Article 85(1). The power of the Commission to issue such an injunction for which provi­
sion is made in Article 3 of Regulation No 17/62 of the Council is in harmony with the nature 
of the Community rules on competition which have immediate effect and are directly binding 
on individuals. Such a body of rules, by reason of its nature described above and its function, 
does not allow the improper use of rights under any national trade­mark law in order to frustrate 
the Community’s law on cartels.» See also Case T­65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission 
[2003] ECR­II 4653, paras 164–173 (rejecting arguments on disproportionate infringement 
with rights to property recognised under current Article 345 TFEU; stating that restrictions can 
be imposed under the EU competition rules on the exercise of property rights provided that the 
restrictions are not disproportionate and do not affect the substance of the right). These cases 
illustrate the recognition even early on of potential conflicts between national intellectual prop­
erty rights and the EU four freedoms and competition rules as well as how they have been re­
solved.
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Health67 and trade mark rights in Duales System Deutschland proceedings 
against the European Commission.68 
Defences against application of competition law to intellectual property 
have also been raised on the basis of concepts such as the existence and the 
specific subject matter of intellectual property rights.69 Although defences based 
on these concepts do not appear to concern application of Article 345 TFEU 
directly,70 these concepts seem to reflect protections offered by the Article to 
intellectual property rights.71
The implications of the concepts for competition law treatment of intellec­
tual property rights can be summarized as follows.72 While the existence of rights 
as such cannot constitute abuse of a dominant position, the exercise of intel­
lectual property rights beyond their specific subject matter can constitute abuse. 
Thus, for instance, in AstraZeneca the European Commission noted that certain 
misleading representations made by the dominant firm to acquire supplemen­
tary protection certificates (»SPCs») did not belong to the protected subject 
matter of SPCs that could have been shielded from competition law interven­
tion.73 Moreover, even the exercise of rights that seem to belong to the specific 
subject matter of intellectual property rights can, ultimately, be challenged when 
those rights are exercised in violation of competition rules.74 Thus even refusal 
67 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, Case T­184/01 R [2001] ECR­II 2349; 
Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, Case T­184/01 R [2001] ECR­II 3193, 
para. 143 (recognising the public interest of protecting intellectual property rights as expressed 
by Article 345 TFEU); Order of the President of the Court, Case C­481/01 P (R), [2002] ECR­
I 3401, para. 82 (Article 345 TFEU was not decisive for the outcome of the decision by the 
President of the Court of First Instance and the plea concerning its alleged irrelevance was 
without effect).
68 Order of the President of the Court of First Instance, Case T­151/01 R [2001] ECR­II 3295, 
para. 222 (public interest in the protection of property as expressed by Article 345 TFEU did 
not prevail over the interest to bring an abuse of a dominant position to an immediate end).
69 On this and other aspects of the relationship between (national) intellectual property rights 
and EU competition law and free movement rules, see generally, for example, David T. Keeling, 
Intellectual Property Rights in EU Law. Volume I. Free Movement and Competition Law (New 
York Oxford University Press 2003). For analysis of the existence/exercise dichotomy in the 
context of Article 345 TFEU, see Akkermans – Ramaekers 2010, 310.
70 For instance, in actions before the Court of Justice, pleas based on these concepts do not 
refer to Article 295 TFEU but are typically assessed in the context of Article 102 TFEU, which 
concerns abuse of a dominant position.
71 Commission decision of 15 June 2005 (COMP/A. 37.507/F3 – AstraZeneca), para. 741 
(»This dichotomy, which has gradually been abandoned in later case law, and been replaced by 
the concept of the subject­matter of the right in question, reflects the principle that Commu­
nity law does not affect the property laws in the different Member States (Article 295 of the 
Treaty).»)
72 For a review of the case law, see, for example, Case T­201/04, Microsoft v Commission 
[2007] ECR­II 3601, paras 319–331.
73 Commission decision of 15 June 2005 (COMP/A. 37.507/F3 – AstraZeneca), para. 742.
74 See, for example, Joined Cases C­241/91 P and C­242/91 P RTE and ITP v Commission, 
paras 48–50 (while the exercise of the exclusive right of reproduction in copyright law cannot 
in itself constitute an abuse, it may do so in exceptional circumstances that involve abusive 
conduct); Case 238/87 Volvo v Veng [1988] ECR 6211, paras 7–9 (even though exercise of the 
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to license intellectual property rights – arguably the hallmark of the subject mat­
ter of intellectual property rights – has been held capable of constituting abuse 
of a dominant position in »exceptional circumstances».75
Accordingly, the existence and specific subject matter of rights may benefit 
from at least some protection against and deference to application of competi­
tion law. However, their concrete effects may be limited because the mere exis­
tence of intellectual property rights has little practical relevance when their ex­
ercise can be triggered by markedly minimal activities (e.g. refusal to license) 
and because ultimately even the specific subject matter of rights is not beyond 
competition law but can be intervened against in circumstances where they are 
exercised in violation of competition law.76 Despite the limited concrete scope, 
the concepts of existence, exercise and specific subject matter do act as a rela­
tively simple screen for at least excluding concerns about violating Article 345 
TFEU, which helps avoid the need to apply Article 345 directly. Moreover, the 
concepts also reflect a degree of deference to intellectual property rights as a 
matter of substantive antitrust law and analysis that may seek to avoid the goals 
of intellectual property being undermined without sufficient justification. As 
argued below, though, substantive antitrust standards alone generally avoid these 
two concerns.
5.3. Sufficiency and Desirability of Applying Primarily Competition Law 
Standards
The question about a potential infringement of Article 345 TFEU may often be 
moot since rigorous application of the standards for prohibiting restrictive agree­
exclusive rights for protected design cannot in itself constitute an abuse, their exercise may do 
so if it involves certain abusive conduct). See also discussion in BBC v Commission [1991] 
ECR­II 535, para. 58 (»However, while it is plain that the exercise of the exclusive right to 
reproduce a protected work is not in itself an abuse, that does not apply when, in the light of 
the details of each individual case, it is apparent that that right is exercised in such ways and 
circumstances as in fact to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article 86. 
In that event, the copyright is no longer exercised in a manner which corresponds to its essen­
tial function, within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty, which is to protect the moral rights 
in the work and ensure a reward for the creative effort, while respecting the aims of, in par­
ticular, Article 86 … In that case, the primacy of Community law, particularly as regards 
principles as fundamental as those of the free movement of goods and freedom of competition, 
prevails over any use of a rule of national intellectual property law in a manner contrary to those 
principles.»)
75 See n. 72 above and, for example, Case T­201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR­II 
3601, paras 319–331, for the conditions under which refusals to license can constitute such 
»exceptional circumstances» that abuse of a dominant position results.
76 Perhaps the final frontier is whether mere acquisition of intellectual property rights could 
in some circumstances categorically avoid competition law by not constituting any exercise of 
the rights (and even preceding their existence). On this issue, see, for example, Joseph Straus, 
»Patent Application: Obstacle for Innovation and Abuse of Dominant Position under Article 
102 TFEU?», Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 2010, 189–201.
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ments and abuses of dominant position are generally sufficient for avoiding 
conflicts with national systems of property ownership.
It seems that prejudice to national systems of property ownership would 
rarely (if ever) arise when intervention in intellectual property rights is based on 
the application of sound substantive standards. First, no risk of prejudice of ap­
plying competition law may arise since national systems of intellectual prop­
erty rights already recognise various public policy limitations to the rights, in­
cluding those resulting from national competition policies.77 Since national 
systems of intellectual property rights recognise that intellectual property rights 
are subject to limitations imposed by competition policy, EU competition law is 
generally unlikely to go beyond those limitations recognised in national laws 
and thus prejudice national systems of property ownership.78 Second, any inter­
vention in national intellectual property rights that may result from application 
of EU competition law is unlikely to rise to the level of prejudicing national 
systems of intellectual property ownership. In particular, competition law inter­
ventions in intellectual property rights are limited to specific instances which 
are subject to robust standards for establishing actual, likely or presumed harm 
to competition.79 Because these interventions only concern extremely limited 
aspects of the exclusive rights conferred by intellectual property rights (rather 
than all or the most exclusive rights let alone mere existence of rights) and do 
so only in highly specific circumstances where typically a dominant position and 
other specific circumstances are required, any impact that would rise to the 
level of prejudicing national systems of property ownership is highly unlikely.
Finally, resolving potential conflicts between the goals of competition and 
intellectual property policies can be better achieved by employing the substan­
tive standards of competition law for analysis and regulation of practices than 
by applying formalistic distinctions based on the existence, exercise or specific 
subject matter of rights. The standards of competition law for assessing particu­
lar practices allow, in particular, concerns about undermining incentives to in­
novate to be addressed more specifically than under the simplistic and formal 
concepts of the scope of lawful exercise of intellectual property rights. More­
over, the concepts of existence, exercise and specific subject matter of rights lack 
a sound theoretical basis and explanatory power for determining why and when 
conduct involving intellectual property rights should remain beyond competition 
law intervention and when it should not. In contrast, standards of substantive 
competition law analysis are at least based on explicit theoretical and legal bas­
77 These limitations are also recognised, for example, in Article 40 of the WTO/TRIPS 
Agreement.
78 See also Flughafen Frankfurt OJ [1998] L 72/30 (discussing restrictions on exercise of 
property in national laws).
79 See n. 64 above.
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es that yield predictable outcomes and can avoid potential conflicts with the 
goals of intellectual property policies.
6. Conclusion
Due to its vague wording, the provision presently found in Article 345 TFEU 
has caused confusion as to the restrictions and possibilities it gives rise to. In­
terpreting the provision and unveiling its functions in the context of general 
economic integration are substantially hindered by the lack of explanations for 
introducing such a provision in this context in the first place, as well as for 
broadening its wording. As concepts of EU law, property, ownership and systems 
are to be interpreted autonomously, they may therefore deviate from their stan­
dard meanings in national legal systems.
Interdisciplinary research, as undertaken above, entails a promise of solving 
some of the provision’s riddles. First, historical perspectives illuminate the 
meaning of the statement on (systems of) property ownership in ways which 
may have received too little attention in practice. As Article 345 TFEU is part 
of a complex multi­level system of law, which grows together with European 
integration and establishes a delicate balance between the provisions of the Trea­
ties, it is likely that amendments to the Treaties as well as their interpretations 
by the ECJ rebalance the provision. As a consequence, both the meaning and the 
functions of the article may have changed in the course of the integration pro­
cess. However, the questions of how and to what extent this has happened are 
still open.
Second, Article 345 TFEU is perceived differently and its significance var­
ies in the fields of law which have interfaces with the provision. For instance, in 
the context of Europeanisation of property law, the role of the provision is still 
to some degree open. By contrast, as to competition law, the provision cannot 
be considered deeply significant. In this respect, however, several questions re­
quire more elaborate research. One of these is how the provision’s relationship 
to matters such as European competition policy has developed and what that 
might imply. Are there, say, new problems that will only become apparent once 
Article 345 TFEU has been properly studied, such as regarding the way in which 
the provision coheres with the established applications of competition law? In 
addition, although this provision does not seem to prevent the property law 
harmonisation that the proper functioning of the internal market is likely to re­
quire, it has not been proven wholly meaningless in this field. Therefore, the 
extent to which the provision possibly safeguards Member State competence to 
decide about (the core of) their systems of property law is a question to be stud­
ied further.
